Tel Aviv Diary Nov 18, 2003 - Karen Alkalay-Gut

Tel Aviv Diary - from Nov 18, 2003 Karen Alkalay-Gut

Tel Aviv Diary - from Nov 18, 2003 Karen Alkalay-Gut 


November 18, 2003

Remember the warning of the late Zyggy Frankel’s terrorist poem
I have reprinted here and elsewhere on my site? That all the 
progress of science, all the developments of modern civilization 
will be used against us by those less responsible to that 
civilization… 
And now, as Tom Lehrer didn’t forsee in his song "The Bomb"
(First we got the bomb, and that was good, cuz we love peace
and brotherhood. Then Russia got the bomb, but that’s okay, 
cuz the balance of power is maintained that way.. who’s next? 
...Egypt’s going to get one too, just to use on you know who
So israel’s getting tense, wants one in self defence – 
the lord’s our shepherd goes the psalm,
( but just in case, we’d better get the bomb), 
Iran has become a serious threat. 

We are still recovering from losing our favorite vacation spot, 
Istanbul, and we get thrown another major blow. Did I mention 
that Orit kept urging us to go to Turkey this weekend, because 
she’d been there the week before and thought it was just for us?
Only an overflow of work kept us from jumping on the plane. 
We said we’ll go in a few weeks. 

What I’m getting at is that we’ve been thrown too many punches 
lately. When I met a colleague yesterday looking very stressed,
she told me is was because the new ‘reorganizations’ had made
her life very difficult. And I said that if the rest of the 
world have been okay, these would have seemed like minor 
problems all around. But we just can’t take all that much from 
every direction.

That’s why I try to be as focused as possible in class - as 
obsessive as possible in fulfilling my jobs as teacher, chair 
of the english writers' association, vice chair of the 
federation, etc. it's a testimony that something is working in
the world. not that i'm doing such a great job. but i try. 

i have been reading the geneva accords slowly and they are very
logical. in fact i don't know why some of the right wingers i 
know have instructed their community to return it to sender as 
junk mail without reading it. as if it would be dangerous even 
to know its contents.

It is precisely this fear of knowing all the possibilities i
worry about - because this fear, this dismissiveness of other 
ways is the basis of all terrorist movements.

I mean I think we really have to work out the parameters of the
ethics and praxis of how to live in these times of great stress.
i know my constant illnesses are connected to stress, and 
stress has to be reduced in everyone's life. As well as the
general feeling of impotence and disempowerment. But how do 
you do it without becoming a total idiot? What exactly, 
technically, should be the prescription for living in this
kind of world? 

Is it to delegate a certain limited amount of time to practical 
manifestations of political involvement? (2 hours a month for
demonstrations - one half hour a day for the newspaper so you
know what to demonstrate for - one hour a day for helping
others ) And a certain amount of time for work, a certain
amount of time for health, etc. Where you must not think
of one while you are involved in the other activity.
Compartmentalizing may be the way to stay sane.

I mean i have been thinking for days about something Estee, 
who is in charge of Maccabi in the south, said on Friday night.
A family dinner, discussions of nephews and grandchildren, and she brings in the subject of sick children in her area whose parents cannot afford medication. The medications that used to be free when my kids were small now cost something like 20 shekel - which is nothing to most people i know - but too much for them. So no antibiotics, no antihistimines, no relief for pain for the children. I know I have discussed this before - the tens of thousands of children who are suffering because of government policies that pour money into building community centers in the west bank and allow children in Ber Sheva and Kiryat Gat to go hungry and sick. But at the moment I'm talking about it in context of the mental health of the people who can't do anything about such a tragedy. How to work to change it, and prevent tragedy in your own life by not obsessing about what you can't change. This is not a personal lament - don't write me letters of sympathy - it's a little examination of how to live in this mess. When Alicia told me she had no money to fix her five year old's teeth so she was giving her aspirin to kill the pain until the teeth fall out, for example, i wanted to borrow money from the bank and give it to her - but i know i'll get into more problems that way. So we need to make some parameters for how to solve the problems. Maybe one thing that would help would be a hotline. I've noticed that there are more call-in problem-solving radio and tv programs than before. but most people don't want to be part of the national entertainment. So: what we need is simple hotlines. But maybe they exist already - in the languages of immigrants as well. Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Hebrew, Yiddish.... Anybody know? One the problems we have with the complaints the Palestinians make against the Israeli government is that the Israeli government can do the same thing in Tel Aviv they do in Gaza. Yesterday, for instance, city clerks came to announce they were going to flatten Mishmish - Luckily the lawyer came in time to tell the people from city hall that the proper papers had been filed for approval - last year. Someone didn't notice them. The bulldozers could have come at any minute. This is not evil - it's just a mess. November 18, 2003 Metapicture:   GUSH SHALOM pob 3322, Tel-Aviv 61033 www.gush-shalom.org     International release   November 17, 2003     [The Yediot interview, with four former Shabak heads who sharply   spoke out against the way our government handles the Israeli-   Palestinian conflict, attracted worldwide attention. But so far the   interview was only quoted. The following full translation was distributed   on the discussion list "Alef" by Amy Mina   Jerusalem Friday November 14, 2003     We are Seriously Concerned About the Fate of the State of Israel     Yedioth Ahronoth (p. B4) by Alex Fishman and Sima Kadmon -- When   the meeting is almost over, we ask Avraham Shalom (Bendor) if he   thinks we are on the brink of an abyss. We are on our way, he says,   because all the steps that we have taken are steps that are contrary to   the aspiration for peace. If we do not turn away from this path, of   adhering to the entire Land of Israel, and if we do not also begin to   understand the other side, dammit, we will not get anywhere. We   must, once and   for all, admit that there is an other side, that it has feelings and that it is suffering,   and that we are behaving disgracefully. Yes, there is no other word for it.   Disgracefully.  
  What do you mean disgracefully, we ask, disgracefully at the roadblocks?     All of it, says Shalom, all of it.     What is disgraceful, we ask, do we behave disgracefully in the refugee camps?     Everything, everything, Shalom says. It is all disgraceful. We debase the   Palestinian man individual to all and sundry. And nobody can take this. We too   would not take it if it were done to us. And neither do they take it, why should they   suffer? And we are incapable of taking even a small step to correct this. Shimon   Peres once tried to take this small step, he at least talked about it when I was   GSS director, and then nothing was done.     Q: What did he talk about?     That the music should be changed, says Shalom. The tone that makes the   music. And Peres truly tried to change the overbearing and arrogant attitude of the   Jews. And after all, this entire behavior is a result of the occupation. We have   turned into a people of petty fighters using the wrong tools. And if we don’t change   this, there will be nothing here.     This was the blunt, direct manner of the former GSS director, Shalom, to explain   the sense of urgency that led him, this week, to a unique meeting, the first of its   kind, of four directors of the General Security Service to send a message, a   warning, an alert, an alarm. To put a red alert sign in right in the face of Israeli   society.     Together they have a total of 20 years in the GSS. The four—Avraham Shalom,   Yaakov Peri, Carmi Gillon and Ami Ayalon—under different governments and in   different periods, headed the organization that knows better than any other   organization the innards of both societies, the Israeli and the Palestinian. From   the sewage of the Khan Yunis refugee camp to the offices of the presidents of both   societies.     Not only is the message harsh. The meeting itself wasn’t simple. These are   people who do not always live in peace among themselves. Only Carmi Gillon’s   willingness to join such a meeting with Yaakov Peri, after a long period of   estrangement, proves how much the matter burns in their bones. What ultimately   led them to put their old enmity aside, to overcome the natural embarrassment of   being prophets of doom, and to give up the comfortable addiction they each have to   their present occupation, was the deep sense that something very bad is going on   here. And each of them summarized this sense in his own language and style.     Wallowing in the Mud   In my opinion, Ayalon said, we are taking very sure and measured steps to a   point where the State of Israel will not be a democracy or a home for the Jewish   people. Everything else is commentary.     I completely agree with this phrasing, said Gillon. That is also what brought me   here. I am very concerned about our future. I look at my daughters, who are still   young, and it is clear to me that we are heading for a crash. And we are the second   generation that began the revival, and I would very much like the coming   generations to live in a Jewish and democratic state the way my parents wanted.     And I, said Yaakov Peri, do not foresee any breakthroughs being made by   deliberate decisions. I am one of those who believe in the phenomenon of cycles.   And whether there are seven or 70 bad years, there are always seven or 70 good   years. I think that a large part of the miracles that happened to the Jewish people   did not take place because a government or someone decided on them and   planned them, but because something unexpected and unforeseeable happened.   And I believe that something of this sort will happen in the not-distant future,   because otherwise, we really are bent on doom.     But I can say that from whatever aspect you look at it, whether the economic,   political, security, or social aspect, in each of these aspects we are going in the   direction of decline, nearly a catastrophe. And that is why, if something doesn’t   happen here, we will continue to live by the sword, we will continue to wallow in the   mud and we will continue to destroy ourselves.     Look, said Gillon, the reason that we are here, is because of Ami Ayalon’s   document. But with all modesty, although I am part of it, I think that this is the first   time, perhaps the last, that it will be possible to take four GSS directors, to put   them together for two hours and have them talk about— I don’t know, the most   minor description I can find is: the serious concern for the condition of the State of   Israel. This is the statement of the event. I personally had a great many doubts   about coming to this meeting. I deliberated until this afternoon.     What were your doubts, we asked.     It doesn’t matter, said Gillon in his cautious way. I had doubts. It appears a bit   too dramatic to me, and it is actually dramatic. Because if four GSS directors get   together who know the situation, and who live among their people and not only the   GSS, but are also involved in other social spheres – and they convene and want to   convey a message, it is important that this be the main message, and not if Arafat   is relevant or irrelevant.     Look What They Did to Us   Ami Ayalon is short-tempered, tense, almost emotional. He came to the  meeting   with the avowed goal of promoting the document of principles he authored with Sari   Nusseibeh. He hopes that the support of three other former GSS directors will have   a dramatic effect. One of his achievements from this meeting was the willingness of   his colleagues to sign his document. Ayalon’s pleasure over this was touching.   True, the signature campaign among the Israeli and Palestinian publics goes on,   but the number of signatories is still far from constituting public pressure on the   political establishment.     You know what the paradox is? He asks. I go places all day. I meet with   thousands of people. In the Katamon neighborhood, in Sderot, in Kiryat Shmona,   everywhere in the country. There is no argument over our document. The argument   is not over the paper. The argument is over our rights and obligations as citizens.   Can we have an effect, is it right for us to have an effect, if our call, our cry, our   signature, will do anything. The argument is over what is democracy in Israeli   society at the beginning of the 21st century.     And what you see, says Peri, is apathy, repression, a lack of desire to think   deeply. Look what has been going on over the last three years: there are no   demonstrations, no rallies, almost no protest. Those who do bother to come out   strongly against the government of Israel or against the leadership, put an ad in the   newspaper at their own expense. There is almost nothing organized. Look what   they’ve managed to do to us.     And I think, says Peri, that this interview, this historic meeting, can achieve its   goal if we use it to appeal to the Israeli public. There is a natural resistance on the   part of an incumbent administration to any initiative that it does not make itself. But   I think that a government with any self-respect, a leadership with any self-respect,   must at last hold a debate on such an initiative. Afterwards it can throw the   document away, reject it, say it is unacceptable. But what we have here is   complete disregard. This is true for both the Ayalon-Nusseibeh document as well   as the Geneva document.     I think this is a mistake, because there is a desire on the part of the public, there   is a new sense of openness. In my opinion, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh document   balances, in a more than reasonable way, between what I call "the national   aspirations and identity of Israel as a Jewish democratic state, " and the national   aspirations of the Palestinian people. Its drawback is that its implementation is   dependent on an anarchist society, and who knows how many years it will take for   it to recover. But to come and say that this document or its principles cannot be   implemented because of the condition of Palestinian society—that would be a   mistake.     As of today, says Carmi Gillon, the only political agenda formally on the table is   the road map. The problem is that all of the plans in the last ten years were plans   of stages. The stages were created in order to build trust between the sides. And in   these ten years, this failed, it didn’t work. And that is why I think that the change   that Ayalon and Nusseibeh bring, as does Yossi Beilin, is that they are coming and   saying: okay, this way failed. We tried it for ten years, and no trust was built. Now,   instead of building trust, let us build agreements. This is a different way of tackling   the conflict. Instead of trying to build trust and then agreements, we make the   agreements now, and then roll the carpet back and begin to deal with the stages   until reached an agreement.     As of today, says Gillon, we are preoccupied with preventing terror. Why?   Because this is the condition for making political progress. And this is a mistake.     You are wrong if you think that this is a mistake, says Shalom it is not a   mistake. It is an excuse. An excuse for doing nothing.     We remind Shalom that Sharon accepted the road map.     Yes, Gillon answers in Shalom’s place, but he made a condition to the road map,   that turned the issue of terror into the be all and end all. You can’t see the road   map from behind the terror.     The only person in the Likud who was honest in this matter, says Shalom, was   Yitzhak Shamir. He said: I’ll draw the matter out for ten years, and then another ten   years.     One thing is clear, says Gillon, and that is without an agreement we are down for   the count. And only one thing interests me: how to have a Jewish democratic state   here in the Land of Israel. And after years in which I believed that we had to move   stage by stage, and after we paid the entire territorial price with Egypt and Jordan,   and from a strategic and security aspect this only benefited us, then I think that if   we don’t resolve the present situation and we continue our conflict with the   Palestinians, this country will go from bad to worse.     The question, says Ayalon, is what do we want. After all, for years, our leaders   did not know what to do about the security zone in southern Lebanon. And in the   end, we left there for one reason—because the public said: Gentlemen, we are   leaving Lebanon and stop driving us crazy.     That is why, Ayalon says, I contend that in the coming years we will   comprehend more and more the necessity—not the desire, but the necessity—of   organizing and creating coalitions from the outside.     What do you mean, we ask, popular movements like the Four Mothers?     This brew, which was concocted by the Four Mothers, says Ayalon, is a magic   potion. We don’t exactly know how to recreate it. I know some of the founders of   the movement and I don’t know if they planned what they did in detail. If you ask,   is the process of creating a public movement with a clear goal of what it wants to   accomplish with the details being left for the political echelon the right thing to do,   then yes. I think this is the correct process.     That’s not what happened with the Four Mothers, says Gillon. I want to remind   you that we left Beirut, we left Lebanon before we left the security zone. There was   a political upheaval in Israel that advocated withdrawing from Lebanon, and then   Rabin came up with the withdrawal plan.     This, precisely, was where the GSS had a lot of influence, says Shalom. We   were the first to say that we must leave there back in 1982. We said that it was too   big for us, but the army didn’t want to hear about it.     But the possibility of civil war, we ask, does that not scare you?     Very much, says Shalom. And Gillon says: But this is the idea and there is   nothing else, except for conflict.     The Founder – and the Dismantler     Interestingly enough, the word "conflict" came up in the course of this meeting in   only one context: the conflict with the settlers. We asked Ami Ayalon, since one   of the sections of his plan refers to evacuating all the settlements, how he plans to   do this.     Describe for us, we said, how you evacuate Elon Moreh.     I want to preface by saying, Ayalon says, that here too I begin with the political   echelon. After all, we erred in the public discourse and in the lexicon we created in   the last ten or 30 years. Were we to go to the settlers and tell them: you have been   the pioneers of the State of Israel for the last 30 years, it was because of you that   we were able to reach a situation in which an agreement with the Arab world is   possible, but you are also the ones who will pay the very painful price of the   agreement. And that is why we, Israeli society, have to make sure you have   houses, jobs, that we bring you home. Were this to be the language of public   discourse, we could, in my opinion, neutralize between 75- 85% of the   settlements. I think that such a situation was almost created in a rare opportunity   in the summer of 2000, when the level of anticipated resistance to removing   settlements was extremely marginal, because ultimately, these pioneers realized   that the public wanted something else.     Do you really believe, we asked him, that the manner of public discourse   will change the positions of a large group of fanatical extremists, which to this day   dictates our national agenda?     You don’t understand. At issue are 15% or even 10% of the settlers, he says,   and we have to be capable of facing such a number.     We wondered how Ayalon thinks that it is possible to face 10-15% of the   settlement residents, when we are unable to evacuate even one illegal outpost.   After all, with every evacuation another settlement is immediately established. And   Yaakov Peri says: I think that Ami is saying smart things, but their time has   passed. I contend that that today 85-90% of the settlers, with a simple economic   plan, would simply get up and go home. There is no problem with them. There are   10%, perhaps 12%, of the ideological core with whom we will have to clash. And I   believe that Arik Sharon is perhaps the only person who can do this. As a founder   of the settlements he can also be the one to dismantle them.     The problem, says Peri, is that to this day no leader has ever gotten up in the   State of Israel, pounded on the table and said, "we are going home, because that is   what an agreement entails." Sharon has often talked about the fact that we will be   required to make painful compromises, and there are no painful compromises   except for evacuating settlements. I am sure that Sharon understands this and that   it is difficult for him, ideologically, morally, socially, but the person who was able to   bring about a deal such as the prisoner exchange deal and who could be that   determined, can also get other things passed, such as evacuating settlements.     If Peri is the sober one, and Gillon the cautious and reserved one, and Ami   Ayalon the dreamer—then Avraham Shalom, the man who resigned as director of   the GSS in wake of the no. 300 bus affair, is the cynical version of the little boy   from the tale The Emperor’s New Clothes.     I don’t believe that these 10%, whom Peri mentions, are all that brave, he says. I   definitely don’t think so. Not long ago, at an internal meeting, after I heard that the   "hilltop youth" were like Hamas, I talked to some of them. They told me that there   are 100 activists and another 400 who follow them and 1,000 supporters. Let’s say   that these numbers are correct. So I said: if they were Arabs, would you know how   to solve the problem? Yes, they told me. So I said: so let’s resolve the problem as   if they were Arabs. Take 15 of them, put them under administrative detention, and   see how all the rest do nothing.     And I said something else. I said: you say they are like Hamas? That they are   willing to be killed? The answer was an explicit no. So I am more optimistic in this   matter. When we leave them out there alone, they’ll come. And how they’ll come.     A silence settled on the room, and only Peri said: I would like, how should I put   it, to soften this, without Avrum’s permission.     But Avrum Shalom says: I didn’t say we should have a civil war.     I, says Peri, think that perhaps we can expect a clash and it could be a painful   clash, and if I could avoid it, of course I would. But I don’t think there is any way to   avoid it. There will always be some groups, or some individuals, for whom the Land   of Israel nestles among the hills of Nablus and inside Hebron, and we will have to   clash with them.     If someone can show me a different way, says Peri, I am willing to accept it. But   if there is ever, and I hope that in the foreseeable future, there will be peace with the   Palestinians—then I don’t see how the State of Israel can be responsible for the   safety of its citizens living in Hebron. I don’t know how to do it, and I don’t think   anyone else knows. And that is the real problem. And I’m not making light of the   fact that Hebron is the city of the forefathers, but it must return to the Palestinians,   and those who live there today will have to leave, sooner or later.     All of us here, says Ayalon, speak of something that is the consensus, that is   not just confined to this room, but is common to all Israeli society: we want a   country that is a democracy and a home for the Jewish people. And that is why I   will state in clear words: in the life of every country or nation, there is more than   one Altalena. The political leadership of the State of Israel has made difficult   decisions in the past hen it was clear what the alternative was, and a future   political leadership will have to make difficult decisions when the alternative is clear.     A very narrow square   There is something surprising, unexpected, about hearing the GSS people, who   are responsible one day for targeted killings and assassinations and closures and   roadblocks, and the next day, when they are released, they present a worldview   that is very far from this policy, one that it is easy to call left wing.     Interestingly enough, they firmly reject their definition as leftists, and are almost   offended by it. But Peri says: This sociological phenomenon should be studied   one day. Why is it that everyone—GSS directors, chiefs of staff, former security   personnel—after a long service in security organizations, become the advocates of   reconciliation with the Palestinians. Why? Because they come from there.   Because they were there. We know the material, the people, the field, and   surprisingly enough, both sides. And once you come from there, you know the   scents and can characterize and diagnose them.     Do you mean to say, we asked, that the present GSS Director Avi Dichter, with   his positions on tightening closures and increasing roadblocks, could be released   tomorrow from the GSS and present positions that are identical to yours?     Certainly, they say, without a doubt. I worked with three prime ministers, says   Shalom, and had a different effect on each of them, without wanting to. The same   words that I said echoed on different walls: One green, one blue and one yellow.   That’s the way it is. And I have to admit: Each time I was hit by the ricocheting   paint. But the effect was great. And you have to remember that as a GSS   director, you have to be non-partisan. You have no political influence, and it should   not interest you either. If you cannot serve under a certain government, resign. But   if you can live with the guidelines of the war against terror, then you do it to the   best of your ability, with all the means at your disposal. And the statements you   make to the prime ministers constitute an influence, in the absence of anyone else   to do it.     The GSS has a critical effect, because it is the only one that is familiar with the   material. There is no one else. That is why I don’t buy the definitions that are   directed at Dichter: What happened to him. Nothing happened to him. The State   of Israel is what happened to him that is what happened to him.     Excuse us, we said, but there is still a debate here with the chief of staff, who   argues that the blockades, the closures and the treatment of the Palestinian   population create a problem of expanding the circles of terror.     The strategy today, says Gillon, is how to prevent the next terror attack. Period.   And it is Dichter’s duty to come and say how best to prevent the next terror attack.   So it is true that the chief of staff is justified in saying that it is better to think in   broader terms, and to ask how to prevent the coming terror attacks and not just the   next terror attack. But I think that the problem, as of today, is that the political   agenda has become solely a security agenda.     A tactical-operative agenda, amends Shalom.     Yes, says Gillon, and it only deals with the question of how to prevent the next   terror attack, not the question how it is at all possible to pull ourselves out of the   mess that we are in today.     The existing gap is at the political echelon, says Ayalon, and it lies in the fact   that there is no balance to operative thinking. We have built a strategy of   immediate prevention. I want to give an example that may surprise you. When   Bibi Netanyahu came back from Wye Plantation, the GSS’s position was against   withdrawing from the territory, because it appeared to us as a withdrawal with the   intention of returning. It was not a real process, at least according to my   understanding of the security cabinet and the Palestinian Authority at the time.   And there were definitely situations when I, with my opinions as you know them,   when I was in my position—thought that it was wrong to withdraw from the territory.     And I have another example, said Gillon. The withdrawal from seven cities in the   West Bank. The withdrawal was set with a predetermined timetable, and I, as   GSS director at the time, thought that this was wrong, and that conditions should   be posed and fulfilled in advance, and only then should we withdraw from the next   city. Eventually, the political echelon, which was the late Yitzhak Rabin, sat down   and made the decision.     The problem, says Peri, is not the differences of opinion between the army and   the GSS, nor if someone changed his opinion. The problem is that when there is   no political direction, senior position holders such as the chief of staff or GSS   director may—and I am not saying that this is happening—lose their path, or   become confused or vague. If the State of Israel, the government of Israel, the   narrow kitchenette, the security cabinet, were to step forward and say: This is   where the State of Israel intends to go over the coming years, this is where we   want to go, it would be a different story. But when there is no political direction—a   senior position holder is ultimately forced to stick to his very square framework,   where he does not share the responsibility, since the GSS’s role is to thwart terror,   period. And it is the IDF’s role to provide internal and external security to the State   of Israel, period. And this square, in the reality that exists today, is very narrow. It   is not strategic. It remains at a tactical level.     And I have to tell you, that we should doff our hats to the security establishment,   who succeed in doing what they do within this limited framework.     In this context, says Gillon, remember that in the days of the Rabin and Peres   governments, there was a very clear policy: That we should fight terror as though   there were no peace process, and continue the peace process as though there   were no terror. That is precisely the direction that the GSS should be given.     When you talk about a political direction, we ask, did Barak’s government supply   such a direction?     Barak’s government, in my opinion, said Peri, did not signal in any political   direction. Can anyone here tell me which direction Barak was going in, aside from   the well known statement in the last hour of Camp David?     Yes, guffawed Shalom, that there is no one to talk to.     I think, said Peri, that all of the Israeli governments after Rabin, for the past seven   years, did not signal and did not tell the Israeli public or the security forces, where   they wanted to reach. And that is the reason that we have gathered here today,   after extra-parliamentary initiatives have arisen as a result of personal   acquaintance, as a result of familiarity with the material, and these initiatives enter   into the vacuum created by political deficiency.     Mistaken attitude towards Abu Mazen   Ayalon: Yaakov Peri says that one of the great errors of the political leadership   today is that fact that most of the debate revolves around the question whether we   do or do not have a partner. And I think that this is indeed an error. In this terrible   situation, where civilians are slaughtered in restaurants and buses, in my opinion   there is no other way but to take unilateral steps. And I believe that if the State of   Israel were to get up tomorrow morning—or three years ago, as far as I am   concerned—and leave the Gaza Strip and Gush Katif, and really and truly begin to   dismantle illegal settlements, then I tend to believe, based on long standing   acquaintance with our future dialogue partners—that the Palestinians would come   to the negotiating table.     We asked Shalom if he agrees with Peri. Yes, he says, one hundred percent.   Gillon and Ayalon also agree with him.     Therefore, continues Peri, it is an error of the first order that most of the things we   hear on the news and in the press consist of the question whether Arafat is relevant   or irrelevant, or whether we should expel Arafat or not expel him, or whether we do   or do not have a partner. And I accept that the State of Israel erred in its attitude   towards Abu Mazen’s cabinet on many topics.     Q: Was it also an error to destroy the PA’s security services in the three years of   combat?     Yes, says Peri. And I think that what we did with Jibril Rajoub was an error.     Yes, says Shalom, grave damage. And the preoccupation with Arafat is primarily   an anachronism, because we will not determine who is relevant and who isn’t. I   believe it was the mother of all errors with regard to Arafat. Just as it is not   dictated to us that Bibi will be after Sharon or Sharon after Bibi, by the same token   we cannot determine who will have the greatest influence over there. So let us look   at the Palestinians’ political map, and it is a fact that nothing can happen without   Arafat.     What you are saying, we said, is that it doesn’t bother you for Arafat to be a   partner.     Nothing bothers me in politics, if I can gain from it. Arafat or no Arafat, one fine   day he will be gone, and someone else will replace him. But in the meantime the   Palestinians are living in steadily worsening conditions.     I think that Arafat is a great obstacle, says Gillon. Over the past ten years we   have tried all types of governments. We have had hawkish governments, and we   have had dovish governments, and we have made compromises. On the   Palestinian side, the same Arafat remained in place. And without handing out   grades to the Israeli side, there is no doubt that Arafat deserves a failing grade. I   don’t believe in Arafat, but I believe in the document of principles. Because it is   good for the Jews. It is good for a Jewish and democratic state. It is good for   Israel, period. And I want us to determine our agenda, not Arafat. And when we   say that Arafat is an obstacle to peace, it is precisely like placing terror before   everything else. Why shouldn’t we come and say: Wait a minute, this is what is   best to preserve this state for our children. This is what assures us peace and   security. The best thing now is to convince and create public opinion that will   come and say: This is what we want. We want to withdraw from the territories.   We are willing to compromise on Jerusalem, we are willing to do all of this because   it is best for our security.     And I think, says Peri, that the State of Israel has made every possible error in   the matter of Arafat, including the latest decision to expel him, thereby putting him   on the stage after he had already sunk into the abyss. And they tried to sell it to   us by implying that there is some kind of trick here, some kind of maneuver that we   mortals do not understand what is behind it. And what was behind it was an   unwise decision by the Israeli government. I think that Arafat is interfering, and   therefore we have two paths: The extra-parliamentary path, for the sake of which we   have gathered here, and the unilateral path. To stop talking about a partner   already, and do what is good for us. And what is good for us is to be able to   protect ourselves in the most effective manner. Not to have to waste too many   troops in Gaza. To waste fewer troops on guarding hilltops and settlements and   three goats and eight cowboys. And ultimately, we will build a fence. The route   can be discussed, and that is already a different story. But we will build a fence.   A fence is necessary, at least to demarcate our ability to defend ourselves.     The red lines are in fact the borders of the historical State of Israel, says Gillon.   We returned to the Green Line in the agreement with Egypt. In Jordan. In   Lebanon. The tradeoff that the Rabin government and Netanyahu conducted, was   also on the Green Line. Therefore, it is clear to me that our borders in Judea and   Samaria, and certainly in the Gaza Strip, run along the Green Line. The separation   fence is becoming irrelevant. It is a fence that is not a fence, that follows borders   that are not borders.     I am also troubled by the fence, says Shalom. A fence succeeds on two   conditions: That no one ever passes in either direction, and that the discipline of   those who guard the fence is at the level of the Germans. And that will not happen.   Today’s fence is creating a political and security reality that will become a   problem. Why? Because it creates hatred, it expropriates land, and annexes   hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to the State of Israel. This is contrary to our   interests, according to which we view the State of Israel as the home of the Jewish   people.     The result, says Shalom, is that the fence achieves the exact opposite of what   was intended. Instead of creating a reality of separation and maintaining a window   of opportunity for "two states for two peoples," a situation has been created where   this window of opportunity is gradually closing. The Palestinians are arguing: You   wanted two states, and instead you are closing us up in a South African reality.   Therefore, the more we support the fence, they lose their dream and hope for an   independent Palestinian state.     Lost honor   Shalom later says that until we understand that we have come to the Arab  world   in the Middle East, rather than the Arabs having come to the Jewish world, until we   really understand that—nothing will happen here. Because our education is at   least as flawed as the Palestinians, who say that there is no State of Israel, that   we should be thrown into the sea. Our attitude on the issue of Arab honor is   catastrophic, he says. I have no harsher words to use. But it is also due to the   fact that we are also like that to one another, and if we have not succeeded in being   nice between Jews, how can it be demanded that we be nice to the Arabs?     And I mean that they should stop knocking around the Arab population. The fact   that we do not allow them to leave through this door, but only through that door.   And this one with his car, and that one without his car.     And that is not the GSS’s role, says Peri, this policy. There is a prime minister,   there is a defense minister. Imagine that Avi Dichter would come tomorrow and   say that we should drop an atom bomb on Gaza. So because it is a   recommendation of the most critical echelon, it would be done? There is a   leadership in the State of Israel. Excuse me, there should be a leadership.     All right, we said, let’s set aside the matter of the closures and bypass roads.   The measure known as targeted killing was also not invented today, but it seems   that it is being used differently today.     Excuse me, says Ayalon, once it was an operative consideration. It did not   become a political strategy. Today it is not the GSS that carries out targeted   killings. It is the State of Israel that does so today as a policy.     And I say, added Shalom, that it has become an excuse. And this is something   that cannot be explained to someone who does not understand about thwarting   terror. Because terror is not thwarted with bombs or helicopters, but rather quietly.   And the less we talk about it, the better. Believe me, if we were quieter, there   would be fewer terror attacks.     Once thwarting terror was a surgical operation, says Gillon. Today it is an HMO.   The business has become cheapened.     And why does this increase terror, says Shalom, because it is overt, because it   carries an element of vindictiveness.     Thwarting terror in and of itself, says Ayalon, cannot be government policy. It   must be GSS policy. Then thwarting terror will also be more effective, and the level   of security will be higher, if alongside the thwarting of terror there is a political   process, a political vision and faith. And I am talking about the Palestinian side at   the moment. For at the end of the day, they will reach a Palestinian state.     Take Advantage of the Wind     The gloomy feeling that pervaded this meeting cannot be overstated. It appeared   that the four GSS directors had decided to speak because of the belief that what   they say could lead to a turning point. Or perhaps they thought that the very act of   holding this dramatic meeting would also be its strength. That it could shake up old   conceptions and rock the apathetic and despaired public. Peri was the first to   discern the mood of despondency that was liable to hover over their remarks.     There are four GSS directors sitting here, he said, and this is liable to be   perceived as if we were writing a requiem for the country. And it is not so. We   came after long and exhausting political service, as volunteers and contributors,   because we are worried and because we are pained. Unlike Avrum, I don’t think   that I can call what is happening in the territories "disgraceful." I think that many   things must be corrected. I think our massive and non-specific behavior, what was   previously called "an HMO instead of surgery," is where the affliction lies. This   totality. And you cannot convey to a soldier at a roadblock or to a woman soldier   checking [Arab] women at a roadblock, the precise spirit of the commander.   Sometimes the fear, the lack of experience, the lack of intelligence or just a lousy   commander, are what dictate events. To this day I don’t understand why a tank   driving through the streets of Ramallah has to also crush the cars parked on the   side of the road.     And it appears to me, says Peri, that a call must come out from this room, that   says that when they are sincere initiatives that try to find a solution to the situation,   they must be addressed, by the public as well. And I call on the leadership to   address this in an open and businesslike fashion.     And I, says Ayalon, want to relate to the most terrible thing that has happened to   us. And I am not referring to everything that has been said here, which I do not   belittle and which I think is terrible. I think that much of what we are doing today in   Judea, Samaria and Gaza is immoral, some of it patently immoral. And I think that   over time, they pose a very big question mark on where we will be in another 20-30   years.     But I think that what has happened to us—and this is even worse than the fact   that we’ve moved from surgery to the HMO waiting room—is the loss of hope. And   I’m speaking of both sides. Almost everything that we do to them and that they do   to us, were we able to put it into a context of time and to say that this is just a   stage on the way to something better, would be tolerable. The problem is that   today, neither us nor they see any better future, and this is the consequence of   what we are doing today. And that is the most terrible thing. And for this reason, in   my opinion, it is imperative to begin to create hope. Because if the captain doesn’t   decide where he wants to go, there is no wind in the world that can take him.     Yes guys, says, Ayalon, that is correct. The sea is always stormy. And you   can’t take advantage of the wind if you don’t know where you want it to take you.       The Participants:     Avraham Shalom (Bendor). Shalom was GSS director between December 1980   and September 1986. At his request, he ended his term in September 1986 in   wake of the commission of inquiry that investigated the no. 300 bus affair. Avraham   Shalom is one of the group of top GSS officials granted clemency by the president.   When he ended his term, he became an independent businessman, mainly   overseas. Among other things, he has served as a consultant to international   companies.     Yaakov Peri. He served as GSS director from April 1, 1988 to March 1, 1995. He   was GSS director during the first Intifada. Today he is chairman of Hamizrahi Bank   and chairman of the Lipman Company. In the past he was president of Cellcom and   the prime minister’s adviser on POWs and MIAs.     Carmi Gillon. He served as GSS director from March 1, 1995 until February 18,   1996. He asked to end his service after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. He   was recently elected chairman of the Mevasseret Tziyon Local Council. Prior to   that he was Israeli ambassador to Denmark.     Maj. Gen. (res.) Ami Ayalon. He was the first GSS director to come from outside   the GSS. He served as GSS director from February 18, 1996 until May 14, 2000. In   the past he was the commander of the Navy. Today he is chairman of the Netafim   irrigation systems company and heads the "National Consensus-Signing an End to   the Conflict" initiative together with Prof. Sari Nusseibeh.     END       --   http://www.gush-shalom.org/ ( òáøéú )   http://www.gush-shalom.org/english/index.html (English) minipicture: When I finally got to see the doctor to whom my biopsies had been sent a month ago, he had to look for them in the pile, look for my b lood tests somewhere else, and came to the conclusion that the tests had insufficient results. That is, they didn't get enough cells from the biopsies. So i have to make another appointment and do six biopsies again. next month. if i had cancer i'd be dead by now. you will recall i tried to get the nurse to get an earlier response but i was treated with great disdain. i see a direct connection here between my situation and the country's. November 19, 2003 When Paul Hilder said to me that Israel had a problem with leadership I took my dog for a walk to think about it. And who should we see but old skin 'n bones Lenz'l. Lenz'l, a small mixed breed who looks like a shrunk collie, has been the stud of the neighborhood for years because of his ability to squeeze under fences, between shrubs, and around gates, but has been confined to his house for months by some undiagnosed geriatric canine disease. Lenz'l was the first dog to make friends with my Shusha, who has been attacked by big females so often she used to cringe whenever a dog came near. But what Lenz'l did was to sign his territory, then wait for her to sign on his pee, and then pee again. After that he would look her in the eyes (on the same level) and wait. And she melted every time. Other dogs try to intimidate her (and succeed - but it's no fun - they get pulled away by their owners or kicked by me. Some try to kiss up to her, but it is Lenz'l's self assurance and generousity that wins. Lenz'l must have been the one who taught her to sign by peeing, because females don't usually do that. He taught her a game in which nobody wins territory but both gain friendship.But even though he looks much better now, I doubt whether Lenz'l will get voted in as prime minister. Nevertheless the principle remains the same - So that would be my first criterion for a leader. The ability to play a game for the sake of friendship - to negotiate in that spirit. P.S. I would like him also to be male, because we ARE in the Middle East, about 40, and wearing an open white shirt with the sleeves rolled up. I would like him not to have exclusively an academic or political background and come from an Iraqi mother and a Russian father, probably born on a kibbutz. I would like him to be a socialist realist. November 20, 2003 My friend Malcah couldn't believe I didn't react to that story that was repeated on the media about the mother of one of the soldiers killed the other day on the tunnel road.She had said he was talking on the phone to her son (I think he was giving her advice about the internet) when suddenly she heard shots and the connection broke. she knew then her son was dead. I actually had written a lot about it but erased it all by mistake instead of saving it. Probably because it was too painful to think of posting. But I also erased a less painful note - about the Geneva Accords. Although I see copies scattered on the street here and there, I hear more and more from people who have read the whole thing and actually are pleasantly surprised. "First time I ever heard any kind of offer," said the mailman. And "It's not bad at all!" said Leah. I'm really sorry their voices and others were erased because their reactions were heartened and heartening. There were a very few people who said they returned the Accords to sender with the words, "Trash Mail" on it, but it was easy for me to pretend they didn't exist and/or to hope that they took a peek before they sent them off and/or that they were bluffing. Ur Ishtenem! John says I have strange y's all over this page - i can't see them - they're not in my page, there's no trace of them in the HTML editor - I'm going to ask John to send me what he sees - and in the mean time start a new page. you are visitor number To Karen Alkalay-Gut Diary To Karen Alkalay-Gut home

November 18, 2003

Tel Aviv Diary - from Nov 18, 2003 Karen Alkalay-Gut 


November 18, 2003

Remember the warning of the late Zyggy Frankel’s terrorist poem I have reprinted here and elsewhere on my site? That all the progress of science, all the developments of modern civilization will be used against us by those less responsible to that civilization… And now, as Tom Lehrer didn’t forsee in his song "The Bomb" (First we got the bomb, and that was good, cuz we love peace and brotherhood. Then Russia got the bomb, but that’s okay, cuz the balance of power is maintained that way.. who’s next? ...Egypt’s going to get one too, just to use on you know who So israel’s getting tense, wants one in self defence – the lord’s our sheperd goes the psalm, but just in case, we’d better get the bomb), Iran has become a serious threat. 

We are still recovering from losing our favorite vacation spot, Istanbul, and we get thrown another major blow. Did I mention that Orit kept urging us to go to Turkey this weekend, because she’d been there the week before and thought it was just for us? Only an overflow of work kept us from jumping on the plane. We said we’ll go in a few weeks. 

What I’m getting at is that we’ve been thrown too many punches lately. When I met a colleague yesterday looking very stressed, she told me is was because the new ‘reorganizations’ had made her life very difficult. And I said that if the rest of the world have been okay, these would have seemed like minor problems all around. But we just can’t take all that much from every direction.

That’s why I try to be as focused as possible in class - as obsessive as possible in fulfilling my jobs as teacher, chair of the english writers' association, vice chair of the federation, etc. it's a testimony that something is working in the world. not that i'm doing such a great job. but i try. 

i have been reading the geneva accords slowly and they are very logical. in fact i don't know why some of the right wingers i know have instructed their community to return it to sender as junk mail without reading it. as if it would be dangerous even to know its contents.

It is precisely this fear of knowing all the possibilities i worry about - because this fear, this dismissiveness of other ways is the basis of all terrorist movements.

I mean I think we really have to work out the parameters of the ethics and praxis of how to live in these times of great stress. i know my constant illnesses are connected to stress, and stress has to be reduced in everyone's life. As well as the general feeling of impotence and disempowerment. But how do you do it without becoming a total idiot? What exactly, technically, should be the prescription for living in this kind of world? 

Is it to delegate a certain limited amount of time to practical manifestations of political involvement? (2 hours a month for demonstrations - one half hour a day for the newspaper so you know what to demonstrate for - one hour a day for helping others ) And a certain amount of time for work, a certain amount of time for health, etc. Where you must not think of one while you are involved in the other activity. Compartmentalizing may be the way to stay sane.

I mean i have been thinking for days about something Estee, who is in charge of Maccabi in the south, said on Friday night. A family dinner, discussions of nephews and grandchildren, and she brings in the subject of sick children in her area whose parents cannot afford medication. The medications that used to be free when my kids were small now cost something like 20 shekel - which is nothing to most people i know - but too much for them. So no antibiotics, no antihistimines, no relief for pain for the children. I know I have discussed this before - the tens of thousands of children who are suffering because of government policies that pour money into building community centers in the west bank and allow children in Ber Sheva and Kiryat Gat to go hungry and sick. But at the moment I'm talking about it in context of the mental health of the people who can't do anything about such a tragedy. How to work to change it, and prevent tragedy in your own life by not obsessing about what you can't change. This is not a personal lament - don't write me letters of sympathy - it's a little examination of how to live in this mess. When Alicia told me she had no money to fix her five year old's teeth so she was giving her aspirin to kill the pain until the teeth fall out, for example, i wanted to borrow money from the bank and give it to her - but i know i'll get into more problems that way. So we need to make some parameters for how to solve the problems.

Maybe one thing that would help would be a hotline. I've noticed that there are more call-in problem-solving radio and tv programs than before. but most people don't want to be part of the national entertainment. So: what we need is simple hotlines. But maybe they exist already - in the languages of immigrants as well. Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Hebrew, Yiddish.... Anybody know?

One the problems we have with the complaints the Palestinians make against the Israeli government is that the Israeli government can do the same thing in Tel Aviv they do in Gaza. Yesterday, for instance, city clerks came to announce they were going to flatten Mishmish - Luckily the lawyer came in time to tell the people from city hall that the proper papers had been filed for approval - last year. Someone didn't notice them. The bulldozers could have come at any minute.

This is not evil - it's just a mess.

November 18, 2003

Metapicture:

 

GUSH SHALOM pob 3322, Tel-Aviv 61033 www.gush-shalom.org     

International release   

November 17, 2003   

  [The Yediot interview, with four former Shabak heads who sharply   spoke out against the way our government handles the Israeli-   Palestinian conflict, attracted worldwide attention. But so far the   interview was only quoted. The following full translation was distributed   on the discussion list "Alef" by Amy Mina   Jerusalem Friday November 14, 2003   

  We are Seriously Concerned About the Fate of the State of Israel   

  Yedioth Ahronoth (p. B4) by Alex Fishman and Sima Kadmon -- When   the meeting is almost over, we ask Avraham Shalom (Bendor) if he   thinks we are on the brink of an abyss. We are on our way, he says,   because all the steps that we have taken are steps that are contrary to   the aspiration for peace. If we do not turn away from this path, of   adhering to the entire Land of Israel, and if we do not also begin to   understand the other side, dammit, we will not get anywhere. We   must, once and   for all, admit that there is an other side, that it has feelings and that it is suffering,   and that we are behaving disgracefully. Yes, there is no other word for it.   Disgracefully.   

  What do you mean disgracefully, we ask, disgracefully at the roadblocks?   

  All of it, says Shalom, all of it.   

  What is disgraceful, we ask, do we behave disgracefully in the refugee camps?   

  Everything, everything, Shalom says. It is all disgraceful. We debase the   Palestinian man individual to all and sundry. And nobody can take this. We too   would not take it if it were done to us. And neither do they take it, why should they   suffer? And we are incapable of taking even a small step to correct this. Shimon   Peres once tried to take this small step, he at least talked about it when I was   GSS director, and then nothing was done.   

  Q: What did he talk about?   

  That the music should be changed, says Shalom. The tone that makes the   music. And Peres truly tried to change the overbearing and arrogant attitude of the   Jews. And after all, this entire behavior is a result of the occupation. We have   turned into a people of petty fighters using the wrong tools. And if we don’t change   this, there will be nothing here.   

  This was the blunt, direct manner of the former GSS director, Shalom, to explain   the sense of urgency that led him, this week, to a unique meeting, the first of its   kind, of four directors of the General Security Service to send a message, a   warning, an alert, an alarm. To put a red alert sign in right in the face of Israeli   society.   

  Together they have a total of 20 years in the GSS. The four—Avraham Shalom,   Yaakov Peri, Carmi Gillon and Ami Ayalon—under different governments and in   different periods, headed the organization that knows better than any other   organization the innards of both societies, the Israeli and the Palestinian. From   the sewage of the Khan Yunis refugee camp to the offices of the presidents of both   societies.   

  Not only is the message harsh. The meeting itself wasn’t simple. These are   people who do not always live in peace among themselves. Only Carmi Gillon’s   willingness to join such a meeting with Yaakov Peri, after a long period of   estrangement, proves how much the matter burns in their bones. What ultimately   led them to put their old enmity aside, to overcome the natural embarrassment of   being prophets of doom, and to give up the comfortable addiction they each have to   their present occupation, was the deep sense that something very bad is going on   here. And each of them summarized this sense in his own language and style.   

  Wallowing in the Mud   

In my opinion, Ayalon said, we are taking very sure and measured steps to a   point where the State of Israel will not be a democracy or a home for the Jewish   people. Everything else is commentary.   

  I completely agree with this phrasing, said Gillon. That is also what brought me   here. I am very concerned about our future. I look at my daughters, who are still   young, and it is clear to me that we are heading for a crash. And we are the second   generation that began the revival, and I would very much like the coming   generations to live in a Jewish and democratic state the way my parents wanted.   

  And I, said Yaakov Peri, do not foresee any breakthroughs being made by   deliberate decisions. I am one of those who believe in the phenomenon of cycles.   And whether there are seven or 70 bad years, there are always seven or 70 good   years. I think that a large part of the miracles that happened to the Jewish people   did not take place because a government or someone decided on them and   planned them, but because something unexpected and unforeseeable happened.   And I believe that something of this sort will happen in the not-distant future,   because otherwise, we really are bent on doom.   

  But I can say that from whatever aspect you look at it, whether the economic,   political, security, or social aspect, in each of these aspects we are going in the   direction of decline, nearly a catastrophe. And that is why, if something doesn’t   happen here, we will continue to live by the sword, we will continue to wallow in the   mud and we will continue to destroy ourselves.   

  Look, said Gillon, the reason that we are here, is because of Ami Ayalon’s   document. But with all modesty, although I am part of it, I think that this is the first   time, perhaps the last, that it will be possible to take four GSS directors, to put   them together for two hours and have them talk about—I don’t know, the most   minor description I can find is: the serious concern for the condition of the State of   Israel. This is the statement of the event. I personally had a great many doubts   about coming to this meeting. I deliberated until this afternoon.   

  What were your doubts, we asked.   

  It doesn’t matter, said Gillon in his cautious way. I had doubts. It appears a bit   too dramatic to me, and it is actually dramatic. Because if four GSS directors get   together who know the situation, and who live among their people and not only the   GSS, but are also involved in other social spheres – and they convene and want to   convey a message, it is important that this be the main message, and not if Arafat   is relevant or irrelevant.   

  Look What They Did to Us   

Ami Ayalon is short-tempered, tense, almost emotional. He came to the  meeting   with the avowed goal of promoting the document of principles he authored with Sari   Nusseibeh. He hopes that the support of three other former GSS directors will have   a dramatic effect. One of his achievements from this meeting was the willingness of   his colleagues to sign his document. Ayalon’s pleasure over this was touching.   True, the signature campaign among the Israeli and Palestinian publics goes on,   but the number of signatories is still far from constituting public pressure on the   political establishment.   

  You know what the paradox is? He asks. I go places all day. I meet with   thousands of people. In the Katamon neighborhood, in Sderot, in Kiryat Shmona,   everywhere in the country. There is no argument over our document. The argument   is not over the paper. The argument is over our rights and obligations as citizens.   Can we have an effect, is it right for us to have an effect, if our call, our cry, our   signature, will do anything. The argument is over what is democracy in Israeli   society at the beginning of the 21st century.   

  And what you see, says Peri, is apathy, repression, a lack of desire to think   deeply. Look what has been going on over the last three years: there are no   demonstrations, no rallies, almost no protest. Those who do bother to come out   strongly against the government of Israel or against the leadership, put an ad in the   newspaper at their own expense. There is almost nothing organized. Look what   they’ve managed to do to us.   

  And I think, says Peri, that this interview, this historic meeting, can achieve its   goal if we use it to appeal to the Israeli public. There is a natural resistance on the   part of an incumbent administration to any initiative that it does not make itself. But   I think that a government with any self-respect, a leadership with any self-respect,   must at last hold a debate on such an initiative. Afterwards it can throw the   document away, reject it, say it is unacceptable. But what we have here is   complete disregard. This is true for both the Ayalon-Nusseibeh document as well   as the Geneva document.   

  I think this is a mistake, because there is a desire on the part of the public, there   is a new sense of openness. In my opinion, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh document   balances, in a more than reasonable way, between what I call "the national   aspirations and identity of Israel as a Jewish democratic state," and the national   aspirations of the Palestinian people. Its drawback is that its implementation is   dependent on an anarchist society, and who knows how many years it will take for   it to recover. But to come and say that this document or its principles cannot be   implemented because of the condition of Palestinian society—that would be a   mistake.   

  As of today, says Carmi Gillon, the only political agenda formally on the table is   the road map. The problem is that all of the plans in the last ten years were plans   of stages. The stages were created in order to build trust between the sides. And in   these ten years, this failed, it didn’t work. And that is why I think that the change   that Ayalon and Nusseibeh bring, as does Yossi Beilin, is that they are coming and   saying: okay, this way failed. We tried it for ten years, and no trust was built. Now,   instead of building trust, let us build agreements. This is a different way of tackling   the conflict. Instead of trying to build trust and then agreements, we make the   agreements now, and then roll the carpet back and begin to deal with the stages   until reached an agreement.   

  As of today, says Gillon, we are preoccupied with preventing terror. Why?   Because this is the condition for making political progress. And this is a mistake.   

  You are wrong if you think that this is a mistake, says Shalom it is not a   mistake. It is an excuse. An excuse for doing nothing.   

  We remind Shalom that Sharon accepted the road map.   

  Yes, Gillon answers in Shalom’s place, but he made a condition to the road map,   that turned the issue of terror into the be all and end all. You can’t see the road   map from behind the terror.   

  The only person in the Likud who was honest in this matter, says Shalom, was   Yitzhak Shamir. He said: I’ll draw the matter out for ten years, and then another ten   years.   

  One thing is clear, says Gillon, and that is without an agreement we are down for   the count. And only one thing interests me: how to have a Jewish democratic state   here in the Land of Israel. And after years in which I believed that we had to move   stage by stage, and after we paid the entire territorial price with Egypt and Jordan,   and from a strategic and security aspect this only benefited us, then I think that if   we don’t resolve the present situation and we continue our conflict with the   Palestinians, this country will go from bad to worse.   

  The question, says Ayalon, is what do we want. After all, for years, our leaders   did not know what to do about the security zone in southern Lebanon. And in the   end, we left there for one reason—because the public said: Gentlemen, we are   leaving Lebanon and stop driving us crazy.   

  That is why, Ayalon says, I contend that in the coming years we will   comprehend more and more the necessity—not the desire, but the necessity—of   organizing and creating coalitions from the outside.   

  What do you mean, we ask, popular movements like the Four Mothers?   

  This brew, which was concocted by the Four Mothers, says Ayalon, is a magic   potion. We don’t exactly know how to recreate it. I know some of the founders of   the movement and I don’t know if they planned what they did in detail. If you ask,   is the process of creating a public movement with a clear goal of what it wants to   accomplish with the details being left for the political echelon the right thing to do,   then yes. I think this is the correct process.   

  That’s not what happened with the Four Mothers, says Gillon. I want to remind   you that we left Beirut, we left Lebanon before we left the security zone. There was   a political upheaval in Israel that advocated withdrawing from Lebanon, and then   Rabin came up with the withdrawal plan.   

  This, precisely, was where the GSS had a lot of influence, says Shalom. We   were the first to say that we must leave there back in 1982. We said that it was too   big for us, but the army didn’t want to hear about it.   

  But the possibility of civil war, we ask, does that not scare you?   

  Very much, says Shalom. And Gillon says: But this is the idea and there is   nothing else, except for conflict.   

  The Founder – and the Dismantler   

  Interestingly enough, the word "conflict" came up in the course of this meeting in   only one context: the conflict with the settlers. We asked Ami Ayalon, since one   of the sections of his plan refers to evacuating all the settlements, how he plans to   do this.   

  Describe for us, we said, how you evacuate Elon Moreh.   

  I want to preface by saying, Ayalon says, that here too I begin with the political   echelon. After all, we erred in the public discourse and in the lexicon we created in   the last ten or 30 years. Were we to go to the settlers and tell them: you have been   the pioneers of the State of Israel for the last 30 years, it was because of you that   we were able to reach a situation in which an agreement with the Arab world is   possible, but you are also the ones who will pay the very painful price of the   agreement. And that is why we, Israeli society, have to make sure you have   houses, jobs, that we bring you home. Were this to be the language of public   discourse, we could, in my opinion, neutralize between 75- 85% of the   settlements. I think that such a situation was almost created in a rare opportunity   in the summer of 2000, when the level of anticipated resistance to removing   settlements was extremely marginal, because ultimately, these pioneers realized   that the public wanted something else.   

  Do you really believe, we asked him, that the manner of public discourse   will change the positions of a large group of fanatical extremists, which to this day   dictates our national agenda?   

  You don’t understand. At issue are 15% or even 10% of the settlers, he says,   and we have to be capable of facing such a number.   

  We wondered how Ayalon thinks that it is possible to face 10-15% of the   settlement residents, when we are unable to evacuate even one illegal outpost.   After all, with every evacuation another settlement is immediately established. And   Yaakov Peri says: I think that Ami is saying smart things, but their time has   passed. I contend that that today 85-90% of the settlers, with a simple economic   plan, would simply get up and go home. There is no problem with them. There are   10%, perhaps 12%, of the ideological core with whom we will have to clash. And I   believe that Arik Sharon is perhaps the only person who can do this. As a founder   of the settlements he can also be the one to dismantle them.   

  The problem, says Peri, is that to this day no leader has ever gotten up in the   State of Israel, pounded on the table and said, "we are going home, because that is   what an agreement entails." Sharon has often talked about the fact that we will be   required to make painful compromises, and there are no painful compromises   except for evacuating settlements. I am sure that Sharon understands this and that   it is difficult for him, ideologically, morally, socially, but the person who was able to   bring about a deal such as the prisoner exchange deal and who could be that   determined, can also get other things passed, such as evacuating settlements.   

  If Peri is the sober one, and Gillon the cautious and reserved one, and Ami   Ayalon the dreamer—then Avraham Shalom, the man who resigned as director of   the GSS in wake of the no. 300 bus affair, is the cynical version of the little boy   from the tale The Emperor’s New Clothes.   

  I don’t believe that these 10%, whom Peri mentions, are all that brave, he says. I   definitely don’t think so. Not long ago, at an internal meeting, after I heard that the   "hilltop youth" were like Hamas, I talked to some of them. They told me that there   are 100 activists and another 400 who follow them and 1,000 supporters. Let’s say   that these numbers are correct. So I said: if they were Arabs, would you know how   to solve the problem? Yes, they told me. So I said: so let’s resolve the problem as   if they were Arabs. Take 15 of them, put them under administrative detention, and   see how all the rest do nothing.   

  And I said something else. I said: you say they are like Hamas? That they are   willing to be killed? The answer was an explicit no. So I am more optimistic in this   matter. When we leave them out there alone, they’ll come. And how they’ll come.   

  A silence settled on the room, and only Peri said: I would like, how should I put   it, to soften this, without Avrum’s permission.   

  But Avrum Shalom says: I didn’t say we should have a civil war.   

  I, says Peri, think that perhaps we can expect a clash and it could be a painful   clash, and if I could avoid it, of course I would. But I don’t think there is any way to   avoid it. There will always be some groups, or some individuals, for whom the Land   of Israel nestles among the hills of Nablus and inside Hebron, and we will have to   clash with them.   

  If someone can show me a different way, says Peri, I am willing to accept it. But   if there is ever, and I hope that in the foreseeable future, there will be peace with the   Palestinians—then I don’t see how the State of Israel can be responsible for the   safety of its citizens living in Hebron. I don’t know how to do it, and I don’t think   anyone else knows. And that is the real problem. And I’m not making light of the   fact that Hebron is the city of the forefathers, but it must return to the Palestinians,   and those who live there today will have to leave, sooner or later.   

  All of us here, says Ayalon, speak of something that is the consensus, that is   not just confined to this room, but is common to all Israeli society: we want a   country that is a democracy and a home for the Jewish people. And that is why I   will state in clear words: in the life of every country or nation, there is more than   one Altalena. The political leadership of the State of Israel has made difficult   decisions in the past when it was clear what the alternative was, and a future   political leadership will have to make difficult decisions when the alternative is clear.   

  A very narrow square   

There is something surprising, unexpected, about hearing the GSS people, who   are responsible one day for targeted killings and assassinations and closures and   roadblocks, and the next day, when they are released, they present a worldview   that is very far from this policy, one that it is easy to call left wing.   

  Interestingly enough, they firmly reject their definition as leftists, and are almost   offended by it. But Peri says: This sociological phenomenon should be studied   one day. Why is it that everyone—GSS directors, chiefs of staff, former security   personnel—after a long service in security organizations, become the advocates of   reconciliation with the Palestinians. Why? Because they come from there.   Because they were there. We know the material, the people, the field, and   surprisingly enough, both sides. And once you come from there, you know the   scents and can characterize and diagnose them.   

  Do you mean to say, we asked, that the present GSS Director Avi Dichter, with   his positions on tightening closures and increasing roadblocks, could be released   tomorrow from the GSS and present positions that are identical to yours?   

  Certainly, they say, without a doubt. I worked with three prime ministers, says   Shalom, and had a different effect on each of them, without wanting to. The same   words that I said echoed on different walls: One green, one blue and one yellow.   That’s the way it is. And I have to admit: Each time I was hit by the ricocheting   paint. But the effect was great. And you have to remember that as a GSS   director, you have to be non-partisan. You have no political influence, and it should   not interest you either. If you cannot serve under a certain government, resign. But   if you can live with the guidelines of the war against terror, then you do it to the   best of your ability, with all the means at your disposal. And the statements you   make to the prime ministers constitute an influence, in the absence of anyone else   to do it.   

  The GSS has a critical effect, because it is the only one that is familiar with the   material. There is no one else. That is why I don’t buy the definitions that are   directed at Dichter: What happened to him. Nothing happened to him. The State   of Israel is what happened to him that is what happened to him.   

  Excuse us, we said, but there is still a debate here with the chief of staff, who   argues that the blockades, the closures and the treatment of the Palestinian   population create a problem of expanding the circles of terror.   

  The strategy today, says Gillon, is how to prevent the next terror attack. Period.   And it is Dichter’s duty to come and say how best to prevent the next terror attack.   So it is true that the chief of staff is justified in saying that it is better to think in   broader terms, and to ask how to prevent the coming terror attacks and not just the   next terror attack. But I think that the problem, as of today, is that the political   agenda has become solely a security agenda.   

  A tactical-operative agenda, amends Shalom.   

  Yes, says Gillon, and it only deals with the question of how to prevent the next   terror attack, not the question how it is at all possible to pull ourselves out of the   mess that we are in today.   

  The existing gap is at the political echelon, says Ayalon, and it lies in the fact   that there is no balance to operative thinking. We have built a strategy of   immediate prevention. I want to give an example that may surprise you. When   Bibi Netanyahu came back from Wye Plantation, the GSS’s position was against   withdrawing from the territory, because it appeared to us as a withdrawal with the   intention of returning. It was not a real process, at least according to my   understanding of the security cabinet and the Palestinian Authority at the time.   And there were definitely situations when I, with my opinions as you know them,   when I was in my position—thought that it was wrong to withdraw from the territory.   

  And I have another example, said Gillon. The withdrawal from seven cities in the   West Bank. The withdrawal was set with a predetermined timetable, and I, as   GSS director at the time, thought that this was wrong, and that conditions should   be posed and fulfilled in advance, and only then should we withdraw from the next   city. Eventually, the political echelon, which was the late Yitzhak Rabin, sat down   and made the decision.   

  The problem, says Peri, is not the differences of opinion between the army and   the GSS, nor if someone changed his opinion. The problem is that when there is   no political direction, senior position holders such as the chief of staff or GSS   director may—and I am not saying that this is happening—lose their path, or   become confused or vague. If the State of Israel, the government of Israel, the   narrow kitchenette, the security cabinet, were to step forward and say: This is   where the State of Israel intends to go over the coming years, this is where we   want to go, it would be a different story. But when there is no political direction—a   senior position holder is ultimately forced to stick to his very square framework,   where he does not share the responsibility, since the GSS’s role is to thwart terror,   period. And it is the IDF’s role to provide internal and external security to the State   of Israel, period. And this square, in the reality that exists today, is very narrow. It   is not strategic. It remains at a tactical level.   

  And I have to tell you, that we should doff our hats to the security establishment,   who succeed in doing what they do within this limited framework.   

  In this context, says Gillon, remember that in the days of the Rabin and Peres   governments, there was a very clear policy: That we should fight terror as though   there were no peace process, and continue the peace process as though there   were no terror. That is precisely the direction that the GSS should be given.   

  When you talk about a political direction, we ask, did Barak’s government supply   such a direction?   

  Barak’s government, in my opinion, said Peri, did not signal in any political   direction. Can anyone here tell me which direction Barak was going in, aside from   the well known statement in the last hour of Camp David?   

  Yes, guffawed Shalom, that there is no one to talk to.   

  I think, said Peri, that all of the Israeli governments after Rabin, for the past seven   years, did not signal and did not tell the Israeli public or the security forces, where   they wanted to reach. And that is the reason that we have gathered here today,   after extra-parliamentary initiatives have arisen as a result of personal   acquaintance, as a result of familiarity with the material, and these initiatives enter   into the vacuum created by political deficiency.   

  Mistaken attitude towards Abu Mazen   

Ayalon: Yaakov Peri says that one of the great errors of the political leadership   today is that fact that most of the debate revolves around the question whether we   do or do not have a partner. And I think that this is indeed an error. In this terrible   situation, where civilians are slaughtered in restaurants and buses, in my opinion   there is no other way but to take unilateral steps. And I believe that if the State of   Israel were to get up tomorrow morning—or three years ago, as far as I am   concerned—and leave the Gaza Strip and Gush Katif, and really and truly begin to   dismantle illegal settlements, then I tend to believe, based on long standing   acquaintance with our future dialogue partners—that the Palestinians would come   to the negotiating table.   

  We asked Shalom if he agrees with Peri. Yes, he says, one hundred percent.   Gillon and Ayalon also agree with him.   

  Therefore, continues Peri, it is an error of the first order that most of the things we   hear on the news and in the press consist of the question whether Arafat is relevant   or irrelevant, or whether we should expel Arafat or not expel him, or whether we do   or do not have a partner. And I accept that the State of Israel erred in its attitude   towards Abu Mazen’s cabinet on many topics.   

  Q: Was it also an error to destroy the PA’s security services in the three years of   combat?   

  Yes, says Peri. And I think that what we did with Jibril Rajoub was an error.   

  Yes, says Shalom, grave damage. And the preoccupation with Arafat is primarily   an anachronism, because we will not determine who is relevant and who isn’t. I   believe it was the mother of all errors with regard to Arafat. Just as it is not   dictated to us that Bibi will be after Sharon or Sharon after Bibi, by the same token   we cannot determine who will have the greatest influence over there. So let us look   at the Palestinians’ political map, and it is a fact that nothing can happen without   Arafat.   

  What you are saying, we said, is that it doesn’t bother you for Arafat to be a   partner.   

  Nothing bothers me in politics, if I can gain from it. Arafat or no Arafat, one fine   day he will be gone, and someone else will replace him. But in the meantime the   Palestinians are living in steadily worsening conditions.   

  I think that Arafat is a great obstacle, says Gillon. Over the past ten years we   have tried all types of governments. We have had hawkish governments, and we   have had dovish governments, and we have made compromises. On the   Palestinian side, the same Arafat remained in place. And without handing out   grades to the Israeli side, there is no doubt that Arafat deserves a failing grade. I   don’t believe in Arafat, but I believe in the document of principles. Because it is   good for the Jews. It is good for a Jewish and democratic state. It is good for   Israel, period. And I want us to determine our agenda, not Arafat. And when we   say that Arafat is an obstacle to peace, it is precisely like placing terror before   everything else. Why shouldn’t we come and say: Wait a minute, this is what is   best to preserve this state for our children. This is what assures us peace and   security. The best thing now is to convince and create public opinion that will   come and say: This is what we want. We want to withdraw from the territories.   We are willing to compromise on Jerusalem, we are willing to do all of this because   it is best for our security.   

  And I think, says Peri, that the State of Israel has made every possible error in   the matter of Arafat, including the latest decision to expel him, thereby putting him   on the stage after he had already sunk into the abyss. And they tried to sell it to   us by implying that there is some kind of trick here, some kind of maneuver that we   mortals do not understand what is behind it. And what was behind it was an   unwise decision by the Israeli government. I think that Arafat is interfering, and   therefore we have two paths: The extra-parliamentary path, for the sake of which we   have gathered here, and the unilateral path. To stop talking about a partner   already, and do what is good for us. And what is good for us is to be able to   protect ourselves in the most effective manner. Not to have to waste too many   troops in Gaza. To waste fewer troops on guarding hilltops and settlements and   three goats and eight cowboys. And ultimately, we will build a fence. The route   can be discussed, and that is already a different story. But we will build a fence.   A fence is necessary, at least to demarcate our ability to defend ourselves.   

  The red lines are in fact the borders of the historical State of Israel, says Gillon.   We returned to the Green Line in the agreement with Egypt. In Jordan. In   Lebanon. The tradeoff that the Rabin government and Netanyahu conducted, was   also on the Green Line. Therefore, it is clear to me that our borders in Judea and   Samaria, and certainly in the Gaza Strip, run along the Green Line. The separation   fence is becoming irrelevant. It is a fence that is not a fence, that follows borders   that are not borders.   

  I am also troubled by the fence, says Shalom. A fence succeeds on two   conditions: That no one ever passes in either direction, and that the discipline of   those who guard the fence is at the level of the Germans. And that will not happen.   Today’s fence is creating a political and security reality that will become a   problem. Why? Because it creates hatred, it expropriates land, and annexes   hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to the State of Israel. This is contrary to our   interests, according to which we view the State of Israel as the home of the Jewish   people.   

  The result, says Shalom, is that the fence achieves the exact opposite of what   was intended. Instead of creating a reality of separation and maintaining a window   of opportunity for "two states for two peoples," a situation has been created where   this window of opportunity is gradually closing. The Palestinians are arguing: You   wanted two states, and instead you are closing us up in a South African reality.   Therefore, the more we support the fence, they lose their dream and hope for an   independent Palestinian state.   

  Lost honor   

Shalom later says that until we understand that we have come to the Arab  world   in the Middle East, rather than the Arabs having come to the Jewish world, until we   really understand that—nothing will happen here. Because our education is at   least as flawed as the Palestinians, who say that there is no State of Israel, that   we should be thrown into the sea. Our attitude on the issue of Arab honor is   catastrophic, he says. I have no harsher words to use. But it is also due to the   fact that we are also like that to one another, and if we have not succeeded in being   nice between Jews, how can it be demanded that we be nice to the Arabs?   

  And I mean that they should stop knocking around the Arab population. The fact   that we do not allow them to leave through this door, but only through that door.   And this one with his car, and that one without his car.   

  And that is not the GSS’s role, says Peri, this policy. There is a prime minister,   there is a defense minister. Imagine that Avi Dichter would come tomorrow and   say that we should drop an atom bomb on Gaza. So because it is a   recommendation of the most critical echelon, it would be done? There is a   leadership in the State of Israel. Excuse me, there should be a leadership.   

  All right, we said, let’s set aside the matter of the closures and bypass roads.   The measure known as targeted killing was also not invented today, but it seems   that it is being used differently today.   

  Excuse me, says Ayalon, once it was an operative consideration. It did not   become a political strategy. Today it is not the GSS that carries out targeted   killings. It is the State of Israel that does so today as a policy.   

  And I say, added Shalom, that it has become an excuse. And this is something   that cannot be explained to someone who does not understand about thwarting   terror. Because terror is not thwarted with bombs or helicopters, but rather quietly.   And the less we talk about it, the better. Believe me, if we were quieter, there   would be fewer terror attacks.   

  Once thwarting terror was a surgical operation, says Gillon. Today it is an HMO.   The business has become cheapened.   

  And why does this increase terror, says Shalom, because it is overt, because it   carries an element of vindictiveness.   

  Thwarting terror in and of itself, says Ayalon, cannot be government policy. It   must be GSS policy. Then thwarting terror will also be more effective, and the level   of security will be higher, if alongside the thwarting of terror there is a political   process, a political vision and faith. And I am talking about the Palestinian side at   the moment. For at the end of the day, they will reach a Palestinian state.   

  Take Advantage of the Wind   

  The gloomy feeling that pervaded this meeting cannot be overstated. It appeared   that the four GSS directors had decided to speak because of the belief that what   they say could lead to a turning point. Or perhaps they thought that the very act of   holding this dramatic meeting would also be its strength. That it could shake up old   conceptions and rock the apathetic and despaired public. Peri was the first to   discern the mood of despondency that was liable to hover over their remarks.   

  There are four GSS directors sitting here, he said, and this is liable to be   perceived as if we were writing a requiem for the country. And it is not so. We   came after long and exhausting political service, as volunteers and contributors,   because we are worried and because we are pained. Unlike Avrum, I don’t think   that I can call what is happening in the territories "disgraceful." I think that many   things must be corrected. I think our massive and non-specific behavior, what was   previously called "an HMO instead of surgery," is where the affliction lies. This   totality. And you cannot convey to a soldier at a roadblock or to a woman soldier   checking [Arab] women at a roadblock, the precise spirit of the commander.   Sometimes the fear, the lack of experience, the lack of intelligence or just a lousy   commander, are what dictate events. To this day I don’t understand why a tank   driving through the streets of Ramallah has to also crush the cars parked on the   side of the road.   

  And it appears to me, says Peri, that a call must come out from this room, that   says that when they are sincere initiatives that try to find a solution to the situation,   they must be addressed, by the public as well. And I call on the leadership to   address this in an open and businesslike fashion.   

  And I, says Ayalon, want to relate to the most terrible thing that has happened to   us. And I am not referring to everything that has been said here, which I do not   belittle and which I think is terrible. I think that much of what we are doing today in   Judea, Samaria and Gaza is immoral, some of it patently immoral. And I think that   over time, they pose a very big question mark on where we will be in another 20-30   years.   

  But I think that what has happened to us—and this is even worse than the fact   that we’ve moved from surgery to the HMO waiting room—is the loss of hope. And   I’m speaking of both sides. Almost everything that we do to them and that they do   to us, were we able to put it into a context of time and to say that this is just a   stage on the way to something better, would be tolerable. The problem is that   today, neither us nor they see any better future, and this is the consequence of   what we are doing today. And that is the most terrible thing. And for this reason, in   my opinion, it is imperative to begin to create hope. Because if the captain doesn’t   decide where he wants to go, there is no wind in the world that can take him.   

  Yes guys, says, Ayalon, that is correct. The sea is always stormy. And you   can’t take advantage of the wind if you don’t know where you want it to take you.     

  The Participants:   

  Avraham Shalom (Bendor). Shalom was GSS director between December 1980   and September 1986. At his request, he ended his term in September 1986 in   wake of the commission of inquiry that investigated the no. 300 bus affair. Avraham   Shalom is one of the group of top GSS officials granted clemency by the president.   When he ended his term, he became an independent businessman, mainly   overseas. Among other things, he has served as a consultant to international   companies.   

  Yaakov Peri. He served as GSS director from April 1, 1988 to March 1, 1995. He   was GSS director during the first Intifada. Today he is chairman of Hamizrahi Bank   and chairman of the Lipman Company. In the past he was president of Cellcom and   the prime minister’s adviser on POWs and MIAs.   

  Carmi Gillon. He served as GSS director from March 1, 1995 until February 18,   1996. He asked to end his service after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. He   was recently elected chairman of the Mevasseret Tziyon Local Council. Prior to   that he was Israeli ambassador to Denmark.   

  Maj. Gen. (res.) Ami Ayalon. He was the first GSS director to come from outside   the GSS. He served as GSS director from February 18, 1996 until May 14, 2000. In   the past he was the commander of the Navy. Today he is chairman of the Netafim   irrigation systems company and heads the "National Consensus-Signing an End to   the Conflict" initiative together with Prof. Sari Nusseibeh.   

  END       --

  http://www.gush-shalom.org/ ( òáøéú )  

http://www.gush-shalom.org/english/index.html (English) 

minipicture:

When I finally got to see the doctor to whom my biopsies had been sent a month ago, he had to look for them in the pile, look for my blood tests somewhere else, and came to the conclusion that the tests had insufficient results. That is, they didn't get enough cells from the biopsies. So i have to make another appointment and do six biopsies again. next month. if i had cancer i'd be dead by now.

you will recall i tried to get the nurse to get an earlier response but i was treated with great disdain.

i see a direct connection here between my situation and the country's.

November 19, 2003

When Paul Hilder said to me that Israel had a problem with leadership I took my dog for a walk to think about it. And who should we see but old skin 'n bones Lenz'l. Lenz'l, a small mixed breed who looks like a shrunk collie, has been the stud of the neighborhood for years because of his ability to squeeze under fences, between shrubs, and around gates, but has been confined to his house for months by some undiagnosed geriatric canine disease. Lenz'l was the first dog to make friends with my Shusha, who has been attacked by big females so often she used to cringe whenever a dog came near. But what Lenz'l did was to sign his territory, then wait for her to sign on his pee, and then pee again. After that he would look her in the eyes (on the same level)and wait. And she melted every time. Other dogs try to intimidate her (and succeed - but it's no fun - they get pulled away by their owners or kicked by me. Some try to kiss up to her, but it is Lenz'l's self assurance and generousity that wins. Lenz'l must have been the one who taught her to sign by peeing, because females don't usually do that. He taught her a game in which nobody wins territory but both gain friendship.But even though he looks much better now, I doubt whether Lenz'l will get voted in as prime minister. 

Nevertheless the principle remains the same - 

So that would be my first criterion for a leader. The ability to play a game for the sake of friendship - to negotiate in that spirit. 


P.S. I would like him also to be male, because we ARE in the Middle East, about 40, and wearing an open white shirt with the sleeves rolled up. I would like him not to have exclusively an academic or political background and come from an Iraqi mother and a Russian father, probably born on a kibbutz. I would like him to be a socialist realist. 

November 20, 2003

My friend Malcah couldn't believe I didn't react to that story that was repeated on the media about the mother of one of the soldiers killed the other day on the tunnel road.She had said she was talking on the phone to her son (I think he was giving her advice about the internet) when suddenly she heard shots and the connection broke. she knew then her son was dead. I actually had written a lot about it but erased it all by mistake instead of saving it. Probably because it was too painful to think of posting. 

But I also erased a less painful note - about the Geneva Accords. Although I see copies scattered on the street here and there, I hear more and more from people who have read the whole thing and actually are pleasantly surprised. "First time I ever heard any kind of offer," said the mailman. And "It's not bad at all!" said Leah. I'm really sorry their voices and others were erased because their reactions were heartened and heartening. There were a very few people who said they returned the Accords to sender with the words, "Trash Mail" on it, but it was easy for me to pretend they didn't exist and/or to hope that they took a peek before they sent them off and/or that they were bluffing. 

Ur Ishtenem! John says I have strange y's all over this page - i can't see them - they're not in my page, there's no trace of them in the HTML editor - I'm going to ask John to send me what he sees - and in the mean time start a new page.

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